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Abstract
In this study, we apply Hansen¡¦s (1999) nonlinear panel threshold test, the most powerful
test of its kind, to investigate the relationship between debt ratio and earnings management of
474 selected Taiwan-listed companies during the September 2002 - June 2005 period. Rather
than a fixed positive relation that is determined from the OLS, our empirical results strongly
suggest that when a firm¡¦s debt ratio exceeds 46.79% and 62.17%, its debt structure changes,
which in turn leads to changes in earnings management. With an increase in debt ratio,
managers tend to manage earnings to a greater extent and at a higher speed. In other words,
the threshold effect of debt on the relationship between debt ratio and earnings management
generates an increasingly positive impact. These empirical results provide concerned
investors and authorities with an enhanced understanding of earnings management, as
manipulated by managers confronted with different debt structures.
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Recent allegations of accounting fraud such as Enron in the US and Procomp in 
Taiwan, have triggered a closer investigation of the topic of earnings management 
(EM) and have brought forth some proposals for revisiting the financial reporting 
process. For instance, the US promulgated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, while 
Taiwan established Corporate Governance Reform Team at the same time.For any 
investors, banks, suppliers, and regulators, they would like to know how and why 
management opportunistically manages (or manipulates) earnings and how this can be 
constrained. Since the manager’s EM behavior is hardly observable in real life, 
numerous studies have been done on it in two waves.   
 
The first wave of research focused on manager’s incentives of EM. One of the 
incentives that appear to influence managers to undertake EM is the firm’s closeness 
to violate debt covenant restrictions. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) first proposed a 
positive relationship between debt and EM. They proposed that in order to protect the 
interest of creditors, creditors usually put strict restrictions in their contracts with 
obligors on annual net profit ratio and debt-to-asset ratio for the company run by the 
obligors. When the debt-to-asset ratio of the obligor’s company runs higher than the 
standards stipulated in the contract, creditors may prohibit the obligor’s company 
from further issuing corporate bonds or distributing the ongoing year’s cash dividends 
to shareholders as stipulated in the debt contract. Therefore, to avert default on debt 
contracts, the managers have greater incentives to engage in EM through the choice of 
accounting policy or discretionary accruals (Dhaliwal, 1988; Press and Weintrop, 
1990; Duke and Hunt, 1990Bartov, 1993). The second wave of research focused on 
earnings threshold. Burgstahler and Dichey (1997) and Degorege et al. (1999) put 
forward the threshold mentality of “attaining performance” as the driver of the 
manager’s EM behavior. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) showed a relatively 
smoothed single-peaked, bell-shaped distribution except in the area of zero earnings. 
Degeorge et al. (1999) also provided evidence of EM that exceeds each of the three 
“thresholds,” namely, reported positive profits, sustained recent performance, and 
meeting of analysts’ expectations. 
 
From standpoint of the creditor, the bank will conclude an agreement with the 
obligor and stipulate the constraints on the obligor’s profit and solvency (i.e. the 
earnings threshold and debt threshold) to ensure the creditor’s equity. The earnings 
threshold has been demonstrated by Degeorge et al. (1999) and Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997).However, similar research in debt threshold is rather scarce. Therefore, 
in this study, we investigate that whether debt threshold exists except earnings 
  1threshold. In other words, what is the proper debt threshold? In what kind of debt 
threshold would the company have serious EM? In view of this, the present study 
captures the extent of the manager’s EM from the view of debt threshold and provides 
a new perspective to regulators, investors, banks and academics. 
 
The second wave of research focused on methodology. Since Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978) proposed the positive accounting theory, many researchers have 
investigated the relationship between debt ratio and earnings management (EM) using 
the ordinary least squares regression model (OLS) (eg, Dhaliwal, 1988; Defond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; DeAngelo et al, 1994). But, do regression functions really fall into 
discrete classes? This prompts us to use panel threshold regression techniques to 
explore this relationship.  The positive accounting theory and related literature 
suggest that there is a simple positive linearity between them when structural changes 
are not considered. Here, we examine whether a non-linear relationship exists when a 
structural change -- in this case, a firm’s debt structure --is considered. As the 
conventional OLS probably cannot diagnose structural changes, our use of these 
techniques seems justified.   
 
Important to note, there are currently two mainstream approaches to investigate 
non-linear time sequences: the conventional one is the “piecewise in time” that uses 
“time” as structure change, while the other is Tong’s (1978) threshold regression that 
uses the “piecewise in variable”. Since the former must subjectively detect the precise 
time of a structure change, its results are not objective and are, in fact, relatively 
inconsistent; but, the latter avoids this shortcoming as a structure change in debt can 
be objectively observed.  Thus, we employ the non-linear piecewise in variable 
method. Tong’s (1978) model does not consider other explanatory variables, but Shen 
and Hakes’ (1995) modified version allows for other explanatory variables on the 
right-hand side of the model. Hansen (1999) suggested the sequential OLS to estimate 
threshold values and regression parameters; he uses the observations of the threshold 
variable to estimate appropriate threshold values, divides the sample observations into 
several regimes on the basis of the threshold variable (higher or lower than the 
threshold values) and uses the OLS to estimate regression slopes, residuals and the 
sum of the square errors. 
 
In this study, we use Hansen’s (1999) nonlinear panel threshold test to determine 
whether one or more threshold effects exist in Taiwan-listed companies. Our empirical 
results confirm that two threshold effects exist. Bridging the gap of earnings 
management in previous studies, this study has some unique features. First, this study 
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solvency. Second, an investor can find the reference for the appraisal of a company’s 
EM extent. Finally, this study reminds the investor to pay more attention to the 
manager’s EM behavior when the company’s debt ratio is at the threshold. 
 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
methodology, and Section 3 presents the data.  Section 4 discusses the findings and 
an important implication. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Nonlinear Panel Threshold Methodology 




> + + ′ +
≤ + + ′ +
=
γ ε β θ μ
γ ε β θ μ
t i t i t i t i i
t i t i t i t i i
t i d if d h
d if d h
EM
, , , 2 ,
, , , 1 ,
,        
          ) (          ) ( , 1 ′ = ′ = t i it ZSCORE h ， θ θ     ( 1 )  
 
where i denotes the ith firm; t denotes the tth period; EMi,t is the extent of EM, and 
its proxy is the absolute value of the discretionary accruals deflating beginning assets, 
as proposed by Warfield et al.(1995), Becker et al.(1998) and Reynolds and 
Francis(2001); di,t is debt ratio (total debt /total asset); r is the hypothesized specific 
threshold value; ɢi is a given fixed effect used to capture the heterogeneity of 
companies in different industries; ɛi,t is white noise in which ɘ1 is the threshold 
coefficient when the threshold value is lower than r;  ɘ2 is the threshold coefficient 
when the threshold value is higher than r; hi,t is the 1x1 control variable vector which 
includes the ZSCORE, Altman’s (1968) financial distress indicator (where the lower 
the score is, the higher is default risk,   which may increase the possibility of EM; 
and  ɞ1 represent the estimates of the control variables.   
 
For equation (1),  the observations are split into two “regimes” depending on 
whether the threshold variable di,t is smaller or larger than the threshold value(r).The 
regimes have different regression slopes,  ɘ1 and  ɘ2.   
 
As our aim is to use the known data of EMi,t, di,t and the ZSCORE, we estimate the 
unknown parameters r,  ɘ andɞ. 
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where  r1 is less than r 2. This is extended to the multiple threshold model 
(r1,r2,r3,…,rn). 
 
Since we hypothesize that debt ratio and EM have an asymmetric nonlinear 
relationship, we set “H0:ɘ1=ɘ2 and H1:ɘ1Źɘ2.” If we cannot reject the null, the 
regression coefficients between the two regimes are equal.  Then, the regression 
equation regresses into a simple regression, and the threshold effect is nonexistent.  
However, when the null does not hold, the asymmetric threshold effect exists, i.e.,ɘ1 
and  ɘ2 in the two regimes can be interpreted differently. We check for the threshold 
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 the F1 statistic significantly rejects the null without a threshold, at least one 
th
3. Data 
We employ September 2002 - June 2005 quarterly balanced panel data for EM, the 
                                                
If
reshold exists. We continue to test how many thresholds exist until the F statistic 
(F3, F4…) is smaller than the critical value calculated from the bootstrap method. 
 
 
financial distress indicator and the debt ratio that we collect from the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange and the Taiwan Economic Journal database.
1 Our sample is 474 selected 
companies (5,688 observations), of which 173 (2076 observations) are new economy 
industries and 301 (3612 observations) are traditional ones 
2(Table 1). The mean of 
EM and debt ratio are 0.0308 and 0.4162, respectively. As concerns the cross-industry 
comparison, we find traditional industries generally have a higher debt ratio than the 
 
1 We choose Taiwan as the sample because Taiwan has superior geographical and cultural 
advancements although it has a small capital market compared with the UK and the US. Technological 
prowess and a healthy investment environment make Taiwan into a critical player in the global context. 
2 The former mainly includes electronics industries; the latter includes the construction, pulp & paper, 
food and steel & iron industries, etc. 
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e also find lower ZSCOREs and greater EM in all regimes. Finally, we compare 
the 
Unlike the OLS results, the observations from the panel threshold model fall into 
di
d effects. Table 2 repor
bootstrap critical values. The statistics F1, F2 and F3 are 33.6131, 16.9379 and 9.3978, 
respectively. F1 and F2 exceed the critical values at the 1% and 5% significance level, 
respectively, but F3 is smaller at the 10% level.    F3 accepts the null of two thresholds, 
i.e., 0.4679 and 0.6217. We define the three categories as “low”, “medium” and 
“high” debt structural regimes if their debt ratio falls between 0~0.4679, 
0.4679~0.6217 and exceeds 0.6217, respectively. The wide range of the first regime 
suggests that most firms belong there. 
 
T
ebt structure) contains the highest number of firms, around 298~319 each quarter. 
Roughly 117 firms fall in the second regime (medium debt structure) and about 44~57 
in the last regime. 
 
T
nsitivity coefficients of the debt ratio (di,t) in the three debt structure regimes. They 
are 0.0350, 0.0547 and 0.0872. These positive coefficients are all significant at the 1% 
level, and the estimated model is:     






conventional OLS and the panel threshold results. Figure 1 depicts the sensitivity 
of the debt ratio to EM in the three regimes and shows the slope of the OLS results 
has a fixed value; the regression functions are identical across all observations, 
implying the margin effect of a firm’s debt ratio in the different debt structures is 
equal. Obviously, the results ignore the possibility that a change in debt structure 
probably exists in the debt ratio and EM relation.   
 
screte classes, and changes in debt structure generate an increasingly positive 
  5impact on debt ratio and EM. Figure 1 shows the slope values between debt ratio and 
EM in the low, medium and high regimes are 0.035, 0.0547 and 0.0872, respectively.   
 
In short, our results indicate that when a firm’s debt ratio moves into a different 
re
5. Conclusions 
We use Hansen’s (1999) panel th stigate the non-linear properties 
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  7Table 1 Summary Statistics 
Obs EM Debt  ratio  ZSCORE  SIC 
Code 
Industry 
 Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
11  Cement & Ceramics  8  0.0196 0.0330 0.3976 0.2027 1.0381 1.2891 
12 Food  19 0.0275 0.3028 0.4274 0.1461 1.2265  0.8243 
13  Plastics & Chemical  20 0.0243 0.0237 0.3846 0.1259 1.7097 0.9763 
14 Textiles  48 0.0275 0.0328 0.4169 0.1897 1.1881  2.0469 
15 Electric  &  Machinery  29 0.0303 0.0352 0.4608 0.1269 1.5788 1.0309 
16 Elec.  Appliance  &  Cable  15 0.0238 0.0212 0.4504 0.1971 0.9804 0.9583 
17 Chemical  30 0.0244 0.0276 0.3367 0.1473 2.6698 3.1639 
18  Ceramics & Glass Products  7 0.0373 0.0719 0.4522 0.2047 0.7436  2.0908 
19  Pulp & Paper  7  0.0172 0.0209 0.3906 0.1148 1.2364  0.8345 
20 Steel  &  Iron  24 0.0355 0.0446 0.4813 0.1470 1.3525  1.1018 
21 Rubber  9  0.0184 0.0183 0.3474 0.1243 1.7988  0.9081 
22 Automobiles  4  0.0208 0.0213 0.3694 0.0828 2.2323 1.1719 
23 Electronics  173 0.0309 0.0406 0.3876 0.1490 2.4277 2.5099 
25 Construction  27 0.0474 0.0645 0.5647 0.1949 1.3831 4.5828 
27 Tourism  6  0.0110 0.0137 0.2994 0.0936 2.2595  2.3023 
29 Department  Stores  11 0.0176 0.0195 0.4969 0.1311 1.2578 1.2969 
99 Other  37 0.0293 0.0322 0.4438 0.1765 1.9244 2.1960 
  All Industries(11-99)  474 0.0308 0.0388 0.4162 0.1666 1.8793 2.3880 
 
 
Table 2 Tests for Threshold Effects and Threshold Estimates 




a (14.5575, 17.3351, 24.8348) 
    
Double-threshold  F2=16.9379
** 0.0420 
  (14.0009, 16.7940, 22.9871) 
    
Triple-threshold  F3=9.3978 0.2900 
    (12.7035, 15.3047, 18.5170) 
 
Threshold estimates 
1 ˆ γ =0.4679,  2 ˆ γ =0.6217 
Notes: 1. 
a 
indicates 10%, 5% and 1% critical values. 
2.
500 bootstrap replications are used for each bootstrap test. 
3.* , ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  8 
Table 3 Firms (%) in Each Regime   
 Regime  1 
Low 
dit  ≦0.4679 
Regime 2 
Moderate 
0.4679< dit  ≦ 0.6217
Regime 3 
High 
dit  > 0.6217 
Sum 
94.06 307  113    54 474 
03 320  101  53  474 
93.12 304  113  57 474 
09 301  119  54  474 
06 298  119  57  474 
03 319  102  53  474 
92.12 312  112  50 474 
09 309  117  48  474 
06 307  117  50  474 
03 313  117  44  474 
91.12 313  112  49 474 
09 312  117  45 474 




Table 4 Threshold Regression Results 
 Estimate  OLS  SE  OLS t  White  SE  White t  
di,t (di,t≦0.4679)  0.0350 0.0150 2.3333
*** 0.0179 1.9553
*
di,t (0.4679＜di,t≦0.6217)  0.0547 0.0128 4.2734
*** 0.0163 3.3558
***









1. OLS SE and White SE represent homoscedasticity and heteroscedasticity standard errors, respectively. 
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Figure 1 Panel Threshold vs. OLS Model Results 
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